Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856.

316 ABRIDGMENT OF THE SENATE.] President's Protest. [APRIL, 1834. Bank of the United States, made it expedient, and quences this principle will be found effectually to deits exposed abuses and corruptions made it, in my stroy one co-ordinate department of the Government, opinion, the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, to concentrate in the hands of the Senate the whole to place the moneys of the United States in other executive power, and to leave the President as powdepositories. The Secretary did not concur in that erless as he would be useless-the shadow of auopinion, and declined giving the necessary order thority, after the substance had departed. and direction. So glaring were the abuses and The time and the occasion which have called corruptions of the bank, so evident its fixed pur- forth the resolution of the Senate, seem to impose pose to persevere in them, and so palpable its de- upon me an additional obligation not to pass it over sign, by its money and power, to control the gov- in silence. Nearly forty-five years had the Presiernment, and change its character, that I deemed dent exercised, without a question as to his rightit the imperative duty of the executive authori- ful authority, those powers for the recent assumpty, by the exertion of every power confided to it tion of which he is now denounced. The vicissitudes by the constitution and laws, to check its career, of peace and war had attended our Government; and lessen its ability to do mischief, even in the violent parties, watchful to take advantage of any painful alternative of dismissing the head of one of seeming usurpation on the part of the Executive, the departments. At the time the removal was had distracted our counsels; frequent removals, or made, other causes sufficient to justify it existed; forced resignations, in every sense tantamount to but, if they had not, the Secretary would have removals, had been made of the Secretary and been dismissed for this cause only. other officers of the Treasury; and yet in no one His place I supplied by one whose opinions were instance is it known, that any man, whether patriot well known to me, and whose frank expressions of or partisan, had raised his voice against it as a them, in another situation, and whose generous violation of the constitution. The expediency and sacrifices of interest and feeling, when unexpected- justice of such changes, in reference to public ly called to the station he now occupies, ought officers of all grades, have frequently been the topforever to have shielded his motives from suspicion, ics of discussion; but the constitutional right of and his character from reproach. In accordance the President to appoint, control, and remove the with the opinions long before expressed' by him, he head of the Treasury, as well as all other departproceeded, with my sanction, to make arrange- ments, seems to have been universally conceded. meats for depositing the moneys of the United And what is the occasion upon which other prinStates in other safe institutions. ciples have been first officially asserted. The Bank The resolution of the Senate, as originally framed, of the United States, a great moneyed monopoly, and as passed, if it refers to these acts, pre-supposes had attempted to obtain a renewal of its charter, a right in that body to interfere with this exercise by controlling the elections of the people and the of executive power. If the principle be once ad- action of the Government. The use of its corpomitted, it is not difficult to perceive where it may rate funds and power in that attempt was fully disend. If, by a mere denunciation like this resolu- closed; and it made known to the President that tion, the President should ever be induced to act, the corporation was putting in train the same in a matter of official duty, contrary to the honest course of measures, with the view of making convictions of his own mind, in compliance with another vigorous effort, through an interference in the wishes of the Senate, the constitutional inde- the elections of the people, to control public opinpendence of the executive department would be as ion and force the Government to yield to its deeffectually destroyed, and its power as effectually mands. This, with its corruption of the press, its transferred to the Senate, as if that end had been violation of its charter, its exclusion of the Governaccomplished by an amendment of the constitution. ment directors from its proceedings, its neglect of But, if the Senate have a right to interfere with duty, and arrogant pretensions, made it, in the the executive powers, they have also the right to opinion of the President, incompatible with the make that interference effective; and if the asser- public interest and the safety of our institutions, tion of the power implied in the resolution be that it should be longer employed as the fiscal silently acquiesced in, we may reasonably appre- agent of the Treasury. A Secretary of the Treashend that it will be followed, at some future day, ury, appointed in the recess of the Senate, who had by an attempt at actual enforcement. The Senate not been confirmed by that body and whom the may refuse, except on the condition that he will President might or might not at his pleasure nomsurrender his opinions to theirs and obey their will, inate to them, refused to do what his superior in to perform their own constitutional functions; the executive department considered the most imto pass the necessary laws; to sanction appro- perative of his duties, and became in fact, howpriations proposed by the House of Represent- ever innocent his motives, the protector of the bank. atives; and to confirm proper nominations made And on this occasion it is discovered for the first by the President. It has already been main- time, that those who framed the constitution mistained (and it is not conceivable that the resolution understood it; that the first Congress and all its of the Senate can be based on any other principle) successors have been under a delusion; that the that the Secretary of the Treasury is the officer of practice of near forty-five years is but a continued Congress, and independent of the President; that usurpation; that the Secretary of the Treasury is the President has no right to control him, and con- not responsible to the President; and that to resequently none to remove him. With the same move him is a violation of the constitution and propriety, and on similar grounds, may the Secre- laws, for which the President deserves to stand fortary of State, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, ever dishonored on the Journals of the Senate. and the Postmaster General, each in succession, be There are also some other circumstances condeclared independent of the President, the subor- nected with the discussion and passage of the resodinates of Congress, and removable only with the lution, to which I feel it to be, not only my right, concurrence of the Senate. Followed to its conse- but my duty, to refer. It appears by the Journal