Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856.

481 ABRIDGMENT OF THE II. OF R.t. Custody of the Public Afoneys-Ar. Wise's JResolutions. [Jum,, 1834. department are responsible to the President.' made by law, the agent for keeping the public And, sir, lest I may not have been understood moneys. But from this step, as to what " always then, I will here explain my views of the extent has been," and is now, it will be found, in the of the responsibility of the officers in the Execu- subsequent paragraph, that he advances another tive Departments to the President of the United step, trampling directly upon the constitution, States. Whenever the laws imperatively re- to what "always must be" the keeper of the quire an act to be or not to be done, or to be public moneys. done in a particular manner, by these officers, Sir, the proposition is,' that, no matter how the President, within the sphere of the execu- or when the public money is obtained, its custive branch of the Government, but there alone, tody always has been, and always must be, is constitutionally bound to "1 take care " that unless the constitution be changed, intrusted to such acts "faithfully" are or are not done by the Executive department."' Now, it will be such officers, and in the manner prescribed. by observed, that the first part of this proposition law. These officers are thus far responsible to is but the mere repetition of the idea or fact the President, because he is responsible for contained in the paragraph already cornmented their acts in every sense of the word. He is on. The precedent of what " always has been" 6 answerable " and "' accountable " for them as done is made the stepping-stone to a claim of they are to him, because there is an obligation constitutional right; and what was said in the of duty imposed upon him, by the constitution, first paragraph was but the preparation of the which he is capable of discharging, and which mind for what is to follow. Sir, "he who runs if li he does not faithfully discharge, he is liable may read " this proposition, to which we have to impeachment, as may be illustrated by a seen the preceding context directly leads, and variety of cases. was intended to lead; and now, I ask, whether Thus, if Congress had enacted that the pub- this broad claim of executive power is lessened, lic moneys should be kept in the Bank of the qualified, or mitigated, in the least, by the sub-United States without any discretionary power sequent context? of removal whatever, given to the Secretary As the preceding context is the groundwork of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Treas- of this pretension, so the subsequent is the ury had rimoved them, with the knowledge of superstructure. Be patient, sir, whilst I search the President, and embezzled them, the Presi- for the truth. What is the next sentence? dent would certainly have been impeachable "No officer can be created," &c. Arn I, is any for permitting a violation of the laws, when he one who ever dreamt of logic, to be told that had the power of removing the officer thus this is any qualification of the first position guilty of a breach of trust. I presume assumed? Sir, it is the very "why and the there would have been but one opinion, espe- wherefore" that the custody of the public cially with the opposition, on this point. But money "always must be intrusted to the Exwhere the laws are not imperative, merely ecutive department." permissive, that an executive officer may or What next? " The legislative power may may not do a particular act, where a discretion undoubtedly," &c., "they may prescribe in is vested in him, the President has not the what place," &c. And is it here that any qualpower to substitute his own discretion in the ification is to be found? Well, sir, I must canplace of that designated by law; because in didly confess that I would be thankful to his this Government his will is not, like that of a most gracious-no, sir, no! not majesty!-for king, the will of the nation. No officer is the that little, " to prescribe the place and the keeper of his conscience, and much less is he reason for removal firom one place to another! 7 the keeper of the consciences of others. Ile can Yes, and we have even the generous admission in no case be held responsible for the exercise that it would be the duty of the President to of another's discretion; and the responsibility see that this prescription should be complied to him from the officer is founded on his re- with! This is gracious, most gracious, and I sponsibility as described to Congress for the was about to take the little that was left me, officer, and not, as is contended, on the power and' be off with it; but "-but! ay, yres, sir, of appointment. He appointed many officers, I am tantalized by a dash, and told, "yet will judicial and ministerial, such as judges and the custody remain in the Executive departmarshals, for whose acts he is in no sense re- ment of the Government! " It is even so, sir; sponsible. In this, then, in my opinion, con- you may say where the public money shall be sisted the abuse of power in the removal of the kept, but "'remember! ay, remember, that I deposits: that the President exercised the legit- am to be keeper! " Is not such a qualification imate power of removal for the illegitimate upon qualification as this enough to fret a freepurpose of virtually substituting his own dis- man? If this be qualification, it aggravates the cretion in the place of that appointed by law. monstrous offence committed; adds insult to With the first of these paragraphs of the pro- injury, and enrages the mind of him, if he has test, then, understood as I am willing to un- any mind, to whose soul, if he has any soul, it derstand it, I perfectly agree. It goes no far- is meant to be'a flattering unction." Sir, it ther than to state the previous and present fact, reminds me of the old common-law notion of that a Department of the executive branch of the relation between a bail and his principal. the Government has always been, and is now The old books tell us that the bail holds his

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Title: Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856.
Author: United States. Congress.
Canvas: Page 484
Publication: New York, [etc.]: D. Appleton and company [etc.]; 1857-61.
Subject terms: United States -- Politics and government

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Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856.

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